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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Torts - Parental Immunity to Suit by
Unemancipated Minor Child
Defendant-father was engaged in his business activity of cutting,
felling, and loading trees while his unemancipated minor son slept
nearby. It was alleged that Defendant-father negligently allowed a
felled tree to be dragged across his sleeping son. The son brought suit
by his mother for injuries sustained. The trial court held the De-
fendant-father immune to suit by his minor child and granted the
Defendant-father's motion for summary judgement. Held, reversed
and remanded: A parent is not immune to suit by his unemancipated
minor child for injuries negligently inflicted by the parent while in
the performance of his business activities. Trevarton v. Trevarton,
- Colo. -, 378 P.2d 640 (1963).
Although ordinary property actions between a parent and his
minor child were allowed prior to 1891,1 no reported English or
American case had answered the question of whether an unemanci-
pated minor child could sue his parent for personal injuries.! In that
year, the issue was raised before the Mississippi Supreme Court in the
case of Hewlett v. George, in which a minor daughter was denied a
cause of action against her mother for false imprisonment. In an-
nouncing a rule which became the judicial precedent for parental im-
munity in a majority of American jurisdictions,' the court said: "The
peace of society, and of the families composing society, and a sound
public policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and the best
interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear in
court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries
suffered at the hands of the parent."5 No authority was cited and
little argument was offered in support of the decision. The issue was
next raised in the Tennessee case of McKelvey v. McKelvey, in
which cruel and inhuman treatment was alleged, and in the Wash-
' McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030, 1057-58
(1930).
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ati. 905, 907 (1930); Matarese v. Matarese, 47
R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198, 199 (1925); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343, 345
(1939).
3 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). Note that in 9 So. 885 the case is styled Hewellette
v. George.
"Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 908 (1930); Cowgill v. Boock, 189
Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445, 451 (1950); Prosser, Torts 675 (2d ed. 1955).
'Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887 (1891).
0111 Tenn, 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
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ington case of Roller v. Roller,' in which the father had raped his
minor daughter. In both McKelvey' and Roller,' the parents were held
immune to the suit by the minor children; Hewlett was quoted and
cited as the only case in point. These three decisions formed a founda-
tion for the rule which granted absolute immunity to parents from
liability to their unemancipated minor children, whether the action
alleged willful or negligent conduct and whether the action was
brought after or before majority."
Recent decisions have produced exceptions to the rule of absolute
parental immunity." The most significant departures have been in
the areas of intentional torts and torts involving conduct which is
willful, wanton, or motivated by malice. As early as 1930, absolute
parental immunity was struck down by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court. The court stated: "Such immunity as the parent may have
from suit by the minor child for personal tort .... is not an answer
to a suit for an intentional injury, maliciously inflicted."" Although
the recent cases uniformly have allowed the minor to maintain an
action if the parent is guilty of an intentional tort or conduct moti-
vated by malice,'3 the courts continue to deny the child a cause of
action if the parent is guilty only of an error in judgment, e.g., ex-
cessive chastisement." The courts also adhere to the rule of parental
immunity in cases in which the parent is charged with ordinary neg-
ligence while acting within the scope of the parental relationship."
Ordinary negligence by the parent in operation of the family auto-
mobile is within the immunity rule;" however, if the negligence is
37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905). But see Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251
P.2d 149 (1952), in which Roller was disapproved for being too broad in holding that a
minor child cannot, under any circumstances, sue a parent for a tort resulting in personal
injuries.
'77 S.W. at 664.
'79 Pac. at 789.
"McCurdy, Torts Between Parent and Child, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 521, 528 (1960).
" Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950), in which the court said: "It
is only in comparatively recent years that dissenting voices have been raised in criticism of
adhering to an absolute rule which in some instances has resulted in a denial of justice."
Id. at 451.
"Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905, 915 (1930).
"3 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d
608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Cow-
gill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251
P.2d 149 (1952), in which the court stated: "It should be mentioned, however, that where
the tort of the parent is intentional or there is willful misconduct, the recent decisions
uniformly allow the child a cause of action." Id. at 152.
"Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951).
" Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Mahnke v. Moore, supra
note 14; Levesque v. Levesque, 99 N.H. 147, 106 A.2d 563 (1954).
"sWright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); St. Croix v. St. Croix, 17
App. Div. 2d 692, 229 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577,
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gross or the conduct is willful or wanton, recovery has been allowed."
Moreover, if the defendant-parent is protected by liability insurance,
a few courts have made a further exception on the ground that no
disruption of "the peace of society and of families" will result, there-
by removing the basic argument for immunity."8 However, the ma-
jority of courts have continued to deny recovery because protection
by insurance will not create a cause of action that does not otherwise
exist."
An exception, which is receiving increasing support, has been made
in cases in which, at the time of injury, the parent is engaged in a
business or vocational activity as distinguished from conduct relating
to parental duty"In Signs v. Signs,2 the court allowed a cause of
action by the minor child against his father for personal injuries
caused by the father's negligence in conjunction with his business
activity and stated:
[W]e have come to the conclusion that, if there ever was any justifica-
tion for the rule announced in Mississippi in 1891, that justification
has now disappeared and that an unemancipated child should have as
clear a right to maintain an action in tort against his parent in the
latter's business or vocational capacity as such child would have to
maintain an action in relation to his property rights.'2
The question presented in the principal case was one of first impres-
sion in Colorado. The court recognized the rule of absolute immunity
as announced in Hewlett and supported by McKelvey and Roller, but
noted a struggle by other courts to support the rule with reason and
74 S.E.2d 170 (1953). But see Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J. Super. 294, 176 A.2d 818 (L.
1962) and Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 253 F.2d 286 (3d Cir.
1958), in which cases a minor child was allowed to maintain an action against the estate of
his deceased parent for injuries sustained in an automobile accident in which the parent was
killed.
17 Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d
608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
"Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va.
11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). In Wick v.
Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927), the dissenting opinion stated: "And if he
[the parent] is thoughtful enough to insure against misfortune due to his negligence to
the public at large, must the court step in and deny the infant member of his family the
same chance in life as is possessed by the public? I think not." Id. at 790.
19 Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Hastings v. Hastings, 33
N.J. 247, 163 A.2d 147 (1960).
"5Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St.
566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Borst
v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). But ci. Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d
636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref., in which case the business exception argument was
rejected, but the court suggested that recovery would be allowed if the conduct of the
parent was willful.




logic." The language of Borst v. Borst" and Dunlap v. Dunlap,"'
which rejected absolute parental immunity in favor of a qualified
immunity, was quoted with approval.' In adopting the theory that
an unemancipated minor child could maintain an action against his
parent if the duty violated fell within the conduct of a business
activity, the court made a distinction between parental duties and
duties relating to business."'
Thus, three exceptions to parental immunity have been allowed:
willful conduct," liability insurance," and business activity." The
most widely recognized of these is that involving willful torts. The
allowance of an action because the defendant-parent is insured has
been rather limited. The instant case is added support to the business
activity exception and is further proof of the courts' increasing dis-
satisfaction with the rule of absolute parental immunity. In limit-
ing the rule announced in Hewlett, the recent decisions have de-
veloped a new concept of qualified, rather than absolute, parental
immunity.
If there is a public interest in preserving the peace and tranquility
within families comprising society and if this peace and tranquility
will be disrupted by a child's suit against his parent, then there is
justification for a qualified parental immunity. However, the peace
and tranquility argument logically will not support an absolute im-
munity because the parent who intentionally and maliciously injures
his child has himself disrupted the peace and tranquility. Further, the
peace and tranquility basis logically will not support a distinction be-
tween parental duties and duties relating to a business activity. A
parent does not wear two hats insofar as his child is concerned. In
Lusk v. Lusk," the court stated:
We are not impressed with the idea that the ills accredited to such
actions may be obviated merely by suing the parent in his business
capacity. Nice vocational distinctions would mean nothing to the child
or the parent. To both, the defendant would be essentially the parent,
23 378 P.2d at 641.
2441 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
2Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
2 378 P.2d at 641-42.
21 Id. at 643.
28 See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
2" See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
30 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
3" 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). The principal case cited Lusk as authority for
the distinction between parental and business activity duties. In Lusk a cause of action was
allowed against the parent who was engaged in his business activity at the time of injury,
but the court rejected the "business activity" distinction and rested its decision upon the
presence of liability insurance. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
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and it would be against him (as such) the child would be publicly
arrayed.3"
Thus, if peace and tranquility of the home are to remain the basis for
qualified parental immunity, there can be no distinction made be-
tween parental and nonparental duties.
Arthur E. Hewett
Torts - Products Liability - Strict Liability of the
Manufacturer
Plaintiff was injured while using a combination power tool and
brought suit against the manufacturer of the tool alleging breach of
express warranty, breach of implied warranty, and negligence. The
trial court held that the manufacturer was not liable for breach of
implied warranty and submitted the express warranty and negligence
causes of action to the jury. The jury's verdict was for Plaintiff. On
appeal, Manufacturer contended that Plaintiff did not give notice of
the breach of warranty within a reasonable time and, therefore,
the cause of action for breach of warranty was barred by statute.1
Since it could not be determined whether the jury verdict was based
on negligence or express warranty, Manufacturer argued that the
error in submitting the warranty cause of action was prejudicial.
Held, afirmed: (1) The notice requirement for breach of warranty is
not applicable in cases involving personal injury; (2) A manufac-
turer is strictly liable in tort if an article which he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to
have a defect that causes personal injury; (3) The plaintiff, in order
to recover, need prove only that he was injured while using the prod-
uct in a manner in which it was intended to be used, that the in-
jury was a result of a defect in design and manufacture which made
the product unsafe for its intended use, and that he was not aware
of the defect. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. 697,
377 P.2d 897 (1962).
The modern doctrine of manufacturer's liability for defective prod-
ucts had its inception in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." In this
case, the court held that an ultimate consumer of an "imminently or
3 2 Id. at 538.
1 Cal. Civ. Code § 1769 (1939), states: "But, if after acceptance of the goods, the buyer
fails to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable
time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be liable
therefore."
2217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
1963 ]
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inherently dangerous product" could recover against the manufac-
turer of that product for injuries caused by the manufacturer's
negligence, irrespective of privity of contract between the manu-
facturer and the injured consumer The MacPherson decision was
heralded as the opening of a new field in liability for negligent acts."
Before MacPherson, express or implied warranty was required in
order for an injured consumer to recover. Because these warranties
are contractual in nature, the consumer had to show that privity of
contract existed between himself and the manufacturer. Aside from
breach of warranty, what other theory or basis of recovery is now
available to the injured consumer?
If negligence is to be the basis of recovery, the consumer must
prove some specific negligent act of the manufacturer. This is many
times an extremely difficult burden considering the present day
methods of mass production and distribution. The consumer is rarely
in a position to analyze the manufacturing process and point to a
specific act that caused a particular defect. If the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is used by the courts to relieve the consumer of this burden,
the manufacturer then has the burden of introducing evidence to
show that he was not negligent in the preparation of the product.
Although this makes recovery to some extent easier for the injured
consumer, he still will have difficulty in contradicting technical evi-
dence introduced by the manufacturer.
If the rule of strict liability is followed, recovery will be allowed
in many cases in which no specific acts of negligence could be proved
by the consumer. By allowing the consumer to recover without proof
of negligence, the manufacturer is, in fact, made an insurer of the
goods he produces. Eminent writers in this field seem to favor this
rule as a means of consumer protection. They further justify their
position on the ground that the manufacturer is the party who can
more easily bear and distribute the loss.
In general, the states conform to one of three patterns in de-
termining the standard of liability imposed upon a manufacturer.
'id. at 1053.
4 Using MacPherson as a pattern, the several states have developed their own variations
of the basic rule. See, e.g., Ellis v. Lindmark, 177 Minn. 390, 225 N.W. 395 (1929);
McLeod v. Linde Air Prod., Inc., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927); White Sewing Mach.
Co. v. Feisel, 28 Ohio App. 152, 162 N.E. 633 (1927); Dunn v. Purina, 38 Tenn. App.
229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954). See also Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69 Yale L.J.
1099 (1960), in which he states: "In 1916 there came the phenomenon of the improvident
Scot who squandered his gold upon a Buick, and so left his name forever imprinted upon
the law of products liability." Id. at 1100.
'James, Products Liability, 34 Texas L.R. 192 (1956); Keeton, Products Liability-
Liability Without Fault and the Requriement of a Defect, 41 Texas L.R. 855 (1963);
Pound, The Problem of the Exploding Bottle, 40 B.U.L. Rev. 167 (1960); Prosser, supra
note 4, at 1122.
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A number of jurisdictions follow the MacPherson rule and allow re-
covery against a manufacturer who is not in privity of contract with
the injured consumer only if the manufacturer is negligent! Twenty-
one jurisdictions hold the manufacturer strictly liable in cases in-
volving food and drugs prepared for human consumption, but re-
quire negligence to be shown in cases involving other products.' Three
jurisdictions hold the manufacturer strictly liable for defects causing
personal injury, regardless of the nature of the product, if the manu-
facturer knew that the product could not or would not be inspected
by the consumer.' In these jurisdictions, decisions are based upon an
interpretation of a statute similar to section 15 of the Uniform Sales
Act.' In each case, the court found an implied or express warranty of
the goods by the manufacturer which extended to persons other than
those in privity of contract with the manufacturer. The California
Supreme Court, itself, previously applied the warranty doctrine to
hold the manufacturers of food and drugs strictly liable for in-
6 Alabama: Birmingham Chero-Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Clark, 205 Ala. 678, 89 So.
64 (1921); Arkansas: Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S.W. 288 (1905);
District of Columbia: Connecticut Pie Co. v. Lynch, 61 App. D.C. 81, 57 F.2d 447 (1932);
Maine: Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. 186 (1925); New Hampshire: Smith v.
Salem Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 92 N.H. 97, 25 A.2d 125 (1942); New York: Bourcheix
v. Willow Brook Dairy, 268 N.Y. 1, 196 N.E. 617 (1935); Ohio: Canton Provision Co.
v. Gauder, 130 Ohio 43, 196 N.E. 634 (1935); Rhode Island: Lombardi v. California
Packing Sales Co., 83 R.I. 51, 112 A.2d 701 (1955); South Dakota: Whitehorn v. Nash-
Finch Co., 67 S.D. 465, 293 N.W. 859 (1940); Virginia: Colonna v. Rosedale Dairy Co.,
166 Va. 314, 186 S.E. 94 (1936); West Virginia: Burgess v. Sanitary Meat Mkt., 121 W. Va.
605, 5 S.E.2d 785 (1939); Wisconsin: Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905
(1927).
'Arizona: Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 83 Ariz. 163, 317 P.2d 1094
(1957); Connecticut: Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Florida:
Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944); Illinois: Tiffen v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 20 I11. App. 2d 421, 156 N.E.2d 249 (1959); Iowa: Davis v.
Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Kansas: Graham v. Botten-
field's, 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); Kentucky: Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v.
Schneider, 249 Ky. 261, 60 S.W.2d 594 (1933); Louisiana: LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1933); Maryland: Bryer v. Rath Packing Co.,
221 Md. 105, 156 A.2d 442 (1959); Massachusetts: Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 341
Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960); Mississippi: Biedenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss.
721, 186 So. 628 (1939); Montana: Bolitho v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 109 Mont. 213, 95
P.2d 443 (1939); North Carolina: Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961);
Oklahoma: Southwest Ice & Dairy Prod. Co. v. Faulkenberry, 203 Okla. 279, 220 P.2d 257
(1950); Pennsylvania: Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 147 Pa. Super. 39, 23 A.2d 342 (1941);
South Carolina: Odom v. Ford Motor Co., 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956); Texas:
Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Utah: Walters v. United
Grocery Co., 51 Utah 565, 172 Pac. 473 (1918); Washington: Mazetti v. Armour & Co.,
75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
'Bookholt v. General Motors Corp., 215 Ga. 391, 110 S.E.2d 642 (1959); Spence v.
Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958);
Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors Co., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
'Uniform Sales Act § 15 states: "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
it known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears
that the buyer relies upon the seller's skill or judgment, there is an implied warranty that
the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose."
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juries to the ultimate consumer." The notice provision of the Uni-
form Act has been applied specifically by the California court in
Whitfield v. Jessup.1
In the instant case, the court, speaking through Justice Traynor,
rejects compliance with the notice requirement as a prerequisite and
also the entire Uniform Act as a basis for recovery. Strict liability
is extended to manufacturers of all products that are placed on the
market with the knowledge that they are to be used without in-
spection by the consumer."2 Consequently, the basis for products
liability in California is no longer implied or express warranty of
fitness, but is strict liability in tort. In establishing the rule of strict
liability in tort, the court departs from all previous authority. Al-
though the court cites four California cases as precedents, these cases
were not decided upon such a rule but rather upon the traditional
implied warranty of fitness and negligence rules. 3 Therefore, in the
principal case, the court developed a new rule not only in California
but in the United States.
The strict liability rule as laid down in Greenman does, however,
provide the manufacturer with some means of protection against un-
just claims. There is language in the case which will allow the defense
of assumption of the risk to be made by the manufacturer,"4 and it
seems to put the burden of disproving the validity of this defense
upon the consumer. The consumer must show that there was a de-
fect in the product, that he was not aware of this defect, and that
he was using the product for a purpose for which it was intended to
be used. The court's restriction of the rule to defects in "design and
manufacture" clearly indicates the extent of the manufacturer's li-
ability. The manufacturer will only be liabile for designing and
manufacturing defects and will not be an insurer for the negligent
acts of the transporter, wholesaler, or retailer. Further, defects re-
sulting from ordinary wear and tear are excluded. The burden will
be upon the consumer to show that the defect was one of design and
10Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939); Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1960).
1131 Cal. 2d 826, 193 P.2d 1 (1948).
S377 P.2d at 900.
1' Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1960); Jones v. Burger-
meister Brewing Corp., 198 Cal. App. 2d 198, 18 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Ct. App. 1961); Vallis
v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Ct. App. 1961);
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1960).
"4The court- stated: "To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that
Plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith [lathe] in a way it was
intended to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which Plaintiff was




manufacture and not merely one that was present at the time of the
purchase or injury.
This rule, while eliminating the negligence issue in a products lia-
bility case, nevertheless leaves difficult questions concerning: (1)
whether the defect was the result of design and manufacture, of ordi-
nary wear and tear, or of negligent acts occurring after the product
left the manufacturer's control and (2) whether the defect in "design
and manufacture" was the proximate cause of the consumer's injury.
Therefore, although the California court somewhat lightens the con-
sumer's burden by relieving him of the obligations of proving specific
acts of negligence by the manufacturer and of conforming to the
provisions of the sales statutes, the Greenman case spells out no easy
formula for recovery. The rule of strict liability, therefore, as laid
down in the principal case is not as harsh upon manufacturers of
consumer goods as it at first may seem.
As stated above, only three other jurisdictions have established
strict liability as the rule for manufacturers of all products,15 but
twenty-one jurisdictions have seen fit to hold the producers of food
products for human consumption strictly liable, while still requiring
proof of negligence in cases involving other kinds of products. The
differentiation between food and other products is based upon a
theory that food products are usually not inspected before use and
are of a particularly dangerous nature if contaminated because they
are used internally. Therefore, public policy demands the manufac-
turer of these products to be strictly liable."
Generally, courts are not anxious to hold a manufacturer strictly
liable because such a rule allows recovery by consumers against manu-
facturers who used more than sufficient care to prevent ordinary de-
fects in their products and because the manufacturers have no de-
fense to the consumer's claim that the defect was in the product
when purchased. However, in the twenty-one jurisdictions which
apply the strict liability rule to food products, these considerations
have been overruled by a strong public policy of consumer protec-
tion from latent defects in an ultra-hazardous product, namely food.7
Why do these jurisdictions extend the public policy only to food
products? It is evident that human health and life may be placed in
even greater peril by other kinds of defective products than it can
be by food products. "Even if it should be felt that the restriction
should be relaxed gradually, and first in the greatest field of danger,
1 See note 8 supra.
e See note 7 supra.1
7Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the food area is not necessarily the most dangerous field. Greater
peril lurks in a defective auto wheel than in a pebble in a can of
baked beans.""8 (Emphasis added.) Following this line of reasoning,
federal courts sitting in jurisdictions following the strict liability in
food rule have indicated on several occasions their desire to extend the
strict liability rule to products other than food. '
It is submitted that the swing of the pendulum of recovery with-
out negligence or contractual warranty should not stop with food
products and that Greeman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc. should serve as
an important precedent in extending the ambit of responsibility.
R. Bruce LaBoon
Oil and Gas - Incursion Upon Rule of Capture
Dictum in the Halbouty Case
The Port Acres Gas Field contained forty-seven producing gas
wells, twenty-five on large tracts of 160 acres each and twenty-two
small-tract exceptions to the spacing rule.' The Texas Railroad Com-
mission issued an order adopting a proration formula for the field'
which allocated the allowable production for each well V3 equally
among the wells and % according to the acreage of each well tract.
Halbouty and other large-tract operators sued to enjoin the order,
alleging that the allocation formula was arbitrary, unreasonable, and
confiscatory of their property. The trial court found the order
reasonably sustained by substantial evidence and denied the in-
junction. Direct appeal was brought to the Texas Supreme Court.
Held, reversed: The /3-% proration formula is invalid; it does not
afford a reasonable opportunity to the large-tract owners to produce
their "fair share" of the minerals. A "fair share" is substantially
equivalent to the recoverable reserves in and under one's tract.
' James, supra note 5.
'
9 B. F. Goodrich v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Siegel v. Braniff Air-
ways, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Brown v. Chapman, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D.
Hawaii 1961).
'Rule 37, Tex. R.R. Comm'n Rules & Regs. § 1, at 11, which requires wells to be
drilled according to the spacing pattern set by the Texas Railroad Commission, is a reason-
able exercise of the police power to prevent waste. Oxford Oil Co. v. Atlantic Oil & Prod.
Co., 22 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 585 (1928); Brown v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935). The rule provides: "[T]he Com-
mission . . . may grant exceptions to permit drilling within shorter distance . . . when
the Commission shall determine that such exceptions are necessary either to prevent waste
or to prevent the confiscation of property."
'Authorization for the issuance of proration orders for gas reservoirs is granted by
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6008, S 10 (1949). This statute enables the Railroad Com-
mission to prorate gas production (1) to prevent waste and (2) to protect correlative rights.
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Halbouty v. Railroad Comm'n, - Tex. -, 357 S.W.2d 364, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
As indicated, the principal issue of the Halbouty case was the
propriety of excess allowables for small-tract exceptions to Rule 37.
This issue had been previously decided in the much-publicized case
of Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n' which dealt with the
Normanna Field. Halbouty followed the precedent of that case. The
holdings of Atlantic and Halbouty in regard to small-tract allowables
have been fully and ably treated elsewhere.' However, another aspect
of the principal case is important. Halbouty contains dictum which
could have consequences more far-reaching than the decision of the
small-tract issue. In the majority opinion, Justice Culver states:
To infer that the rule of capture gives to the landowner the legally pro-
tected right to capture the oil and gas underlying his neighbor's tract is
entirely inconsistent with the ownership theory. To harmonize both
rules, the rule of capture can mean little more than that due to their
fugitive nature, the hydro-carbons when captured belong to the owner
of the well to which they flowed, irrespective of where they may have
been in place originally, without liability to his neighbor for drainage.'
Accepted at face value, this statement seems to eliminate the rule
of capture as the basic law of oil and gas in Texas and relegate it to
a mere title-vesting device.! If the theory of this dictum is followed
in future decisions, unfortunate consequences could result.
The rule of capture may be stated as follows: The owner of a tract
of land acquires title to the oil and gas which he produces from wells
drilled on his land, though part of such oil or gas may have migrated
from adjoining lands.! In its early form, unmodified by statute, the
rule of capture allowed an owner to drain the oil and gas of his
neighbor without consent' or liability.' The neighbor's only remedy
'Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, - Tex. -, 346 S.W.2d 801 (1961),
noted in 16 Sw. L.J. 320 (1962), held on similar facts that a proration formula must
give each owner affected by it a reasonable opportunity to produce the recoverable oil and
gas in and under his tract or its equivalent in kind. As in Halbouty, a i/_2/ proration
formula was held invalid.
' Hardwicke & Woodward, Fair Share and the Small Tract in Texas, 41 Texas L. Rev. 75
(1962).
5357 S.W.2d at 375.
eSee Discussion Note, 16 Oil & Gas Rep. 813, 815 (1962).
'Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 201 (1956);
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (1948); Stephens County
v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923). The rule of capture
was first expressed in Westmoreland & Cambria Nat'l Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235,
18 At. 724 (1889). It was subsequently adopted in all oil and gas jurisdictions.
SCorzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945); Brown v. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
"Ehlinger v. Clark, 117 Tex. 547, 8 S.W.2d 666 (1928); Stephens County v. Mid-
Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923).
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was to "go and do likewise."'" This policy, attacked as a "law of
piracy,"'1 was thought necessary in view of the lack of scientific
knowledge concerning the behavior and extent of reserves." The
oil industry finally became aware that unjustifiable waste was wide-
spread under an unlimited law of capture"' and turned to the police
power of the state for conservation measures. The Texas Supreme
Court responded in Corzelius v. Harrell," holding that the law of
capture is subject to regulation under the police power of the state.
Though limited by the police power, the rule of capture was recog-
nized in Texas as a vested property right,"' in force at least as re-
cently as 1955.'
Texas also recognizes the doctrine of ownership in place of min-
erals' 7-the owner of a mineral interest is deemed to own the minerals
in place or in the ground until he is divested of such ownership by
the law of capture." The two doctrines-rule of capture and owner-
ship in place-are basically incompatible. Since divestment of owner-
ship has been allowed,"' it seems inescapable that Texas courts have
in the past considered the rule of capture as dominant."
The trend of the Texas courts, as evidenced by the Atlantic and
Halbouty decisions, is to require a more equitable distribution of
allowables by the Railroad Commission. To effect this result, the
courts are emphasizing the correlation between reserves and "fair
share," with significant production in excess of recoverable reserves
amounting to confiscation. The Halbouty case stated: "It is an ob-
vious result that if in a common reservoir one tract owner is allowed
to produce many times more gas than underlies his tract he is denying
to some other landowner in the reservoir a fair chance to produce
"0Barnard v. Monogahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 Ati. 801 (1907).
" Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas,
13 Texas L. Rev. 391, 392 (1935).
IsId. at 418.
a Shank, Present Status of the Law of Capture, Proceedings, 6th Ann. Inst. on Oil &
Gas and Taxation at 274 (1955).
'4 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W.2d 961 (1945).
"Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 201 (1956);
Brown v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
"Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, supr4 note 15.
"TStephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923);
Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915). Stephens County also
illustrates the fact that ownership in place had its origins in claiming property for tax
purposes.
"Bickel, The Right of the Lessee to Pool the Mineral Interest of the Lessor Before and
After the Expiration of the Primary Term, 10 Sw. L.J. 165, 168 (1956).
"Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 201 (1956);
General Crude Oil Co. v. Harris, 101 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
"Discussion Note, 16 Oil & Gas Rep. 813, 814 (1962). See Ryan Consol. Petroleum
Corp. v. Pickens, supra note 19.
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the gas underlying his land.""1 This new emphasis on correlative
rights in the application of the police power is highly desirable as
a modification of the rule of capture, unless it is carried to the fullest
extreme of making ownership in place dominant over the rule of
capture.
Ownership in place is not a workable basis for a body of oil and
gas law. 2 The fugitive nature of the product and the complications
of differing expulsion mechanisms preclude it." Even with advances
in the science of reservoir engineering, reserves cannot yet be per-
fectly estimated to determine an absolute "fair share." Gearing re-
covery too closely to reserves would create numerous difficulties.
Established statutes which are grounded in the rule of capture, such
as the Marginal Well Statute,"4 would have to be scrapped. Chaotic
situations would result. For example, would an older well that had
already pumped its estimated reserves be required to be shut down?
How would wells located on the fringes of an oil and gas structure
be compensated for their shortened life? Under strict ownership in
place, they could demand an excessive allowable to enable them to
recover their "fair share" of the common pool before production
from more advantageously located wells caused the fringe wells to
go to water. To be consistent under the ownership in place theory,
an owner should be entitled to enjoin any act of adjacent owners
that induced migration of oil and gas from under his land. He would
also be entitled to damages for drainage caused by production on
other tracts. Would he be entitled to reimbursement to the amount
of his "fair share" if he refused to drill? It is clear that the absolute
ownership and tracing of substances is not a reasonable solution, nor
is the creation of a right to an absolute "fair share." 2 The determi-
nation of the quantity of the "fair share" would continue to pose
an insurmountable obstacle."" The rule of capture remains the only
12357 S.W.2d at 374. See Normanna Fields Special Order No. 2-46673, Tex. R.R.
Comm'n Rules & Regs. § 7, at 917, 14 Oil & Gas Rep. 885 (1961), which resulted from
the Atlantic decision.
a Professor Hardwicke has written:
[Ownership in place] cannot easily be applied, for it would have to be based
upon an ability to identify the exact source and original location in place of
oil and gas, with ownership depending on the initial underground situs, and
not upon the ownership of the well from which the oil is eventually
produced. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and its Implications as Applied to
Oil and Gas, 13 Texas L. Rev. 391, 395 (1935).
2° Halbouty and Atlantic both dealt with gas fields. The reserves of an oil pool, with
its more complex structure and physical behavior, will be much more difficult to measure.
24Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6049(b) (1931). The Marginal Well Statute allows
extremely low producers to produce at maximum operating capacity and prohibits curtail-
ment of the maximum production by the Railroad Commission.





The question of the dominance of the rule of capture has been de-
bated since the inception of the oil and gas industry. Until now, the
Texas Supreme Court has consistently held that "the only safe rule,
and the only one free from much confusion, is the one which gives
the oil to the man who owns the land upon which the well is lo-
cated."" As Justice Griffin said in his dissenting opinion in Halbouty:
"There is no sound reason for the abandonment of the rules of
property which have been long established in Texas."" For conserva-
tion reasons, of course, it is essential that the rule of capture be
limited with effective police power regulations. However, the dictum
in Halbouty seems to suggest more than the police power limitation.
If it means that the rule of capture should now be subordinated to
ownership in place, it should not be followed.
Don C. Nix
Procedure - Nonsuit in Texas - An Absolute Right
The State of Texas filed an ouster suit in district court X against
Defendant, Sheriff of Jefferson County. The State asked the court
temporarily to suspend Defendant from office during the pendency
of the suit, but court X refused. Defendant's answer asserted that
the State, in violation of article 5986,1 was asking for his removal for
acts committed prior to his election. Subsequent to the filing of the
answer, a nonsuit was granted by court X upon the State's request.
The State then filed the same suit in district court Y and again asked
that Defendant be temporarily suspended from office. Court Y
granted the request. After the nonsuit in court X was granted, and
after court Y temporarily suspended him, Defendant again entered
court X and asked it to grant an injunction to restrain court Y from
trying the suit, on the ground that court Y did not have jurisdiction
because Defendant's counterclaim was still before court X. Court X
granted this request and reinstated the action over the State's objec-
tions. Seeking to have the order of reinstatement declared void, the
State invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Texas
'7 Ibid.
2 8 Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925), quoted with approval
in Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 155 Tex. 221, 285 S.W.2d 201 (1956).
"9357 S.W.2d at 382.
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5986 (1962) states: "No officer of this State shall be
removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election to office."
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under article 1733.' Held: Under Rule 164 of the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure,3 Plaintiff has the right to a nonsuit at any time be-
fore the jury has retired or before the judge has announced his de-
cision in a nonjury case, and a nonsuit, once granted, cannot be sub-
sequently reinstated over the plaintiff's protests. Only if the defend-
ant has asserted a claim for affirmative relief can a court refuse to
grant a nonsuit. Texas v. Gary, -Tex.-, 359 S.W.2d 456 (1962).
Under the English common law, voluntary discontinuance by
nonsuit was not a decision on the merits, and thus a plaintiff was
free to bring another action.' As early as 1371, case reports show that
a plaintiff was given the right to nonsuit at any time prior to the
rendering of the verdict by the jury.' The first statutory restriction
was passed in 1400,' and the present rules of the Supreme Court
(trial) of England do not permit nonsuit after the receipt of the de-
fendant's answer.' Thus, in the place of its origin, this common-law
right has been considerably restricted.
Nonsuit came to this country with the importation of the common
law and has been judicially adopted, in the main, by many of the
states. Its status has become so firmly entrenched in our law that in-
stances of change or modification have had to come from the legis-
latures.' The federal rule relating to nonsuit is an excellent example
of statutory restriction.' Under this rule, a plaintiff has an absolute
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1733 (1962).
3Tex. R. Civ. P. 164.
'Head, The History and Development of Non-Suit, 27 W. Va. L.Q. 20 (1920).
'The reporter said: "And the jurors were under guard for three days before they
could agree; now they were finally at the bar ready to have rendered their verdict and
the Plaintiffs were nonsuited. Wilkes v. Gernon, Y.B. Pasch, 48 Edw. 3, 30 (1371).
62 Hen. 4, c. 7 (1400).
'Order 26, Rule, The Annual Practice, Rules of the Supreme Court 429 (1950).
' Head, supra note 4.
'Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 (a):
(a) Voluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(c),
of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of dis-
missal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of a
motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.
Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal
is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudica-
tion upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including the
same claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this sub-
division of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance
save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be
dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court ....
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right to nonsuit at any time before service by an adverse party of
an answer or of a motion for summary judgment. After service,
if the parties to the action have not filed a stipulation of dismissal, the
court in its discretion may refuse to allow dismissal without prejudice
or may allow withdrawal only on terms and conditions."' An illustra-
tive federal decision is Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyan-
amid Co." In Harvey, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking an in-
junction and other relief. After a hearing on the merits in which
plaintiff's request for an injunction was denied, but before the de-
fendant's answer in the main suit was served, the plaintiff moved to
dismiss. The court granted the defendant's motion to vacate the
notice of dismissal. This decision extends beyond the literal wording
of the federal rule, which allows dismissal at any time before service
by an adverse party of an answer or of a motion for summary judg-
ment. Although the fact situation in Harvey is not typical, the hold-
ing is indicative of the restrictive attitude of the federal courts to-
ward dismissal and their implementation of the rule to prevent in-
justice. In the normal case, the right exists according to the literal
wording of the federal rule."'
As a general rule, most state courts hold that a plaintiff has the
right to nonsuit unless the defendant has asserted a claim for affirma-
tive relief. 3 However, the states vary as to when nonsuit may be
taken as a matter of right. Some states have no statutory limit on
nonsuit; thus, the courts in those jurisdictions look to the common
law for guidance. ' Other states which have statutes generally allow
nonsuit until commencement of the trial." About three-fourths of
the states, both statutory and nonstatutory, are liberal as to the time
when nonsuit can be taken, allowing discontinuance even after the
trial is under way." The most liberal statutory state is Louisiana
"0 Ibid.
" 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953).
"2See Barrett v. Virginian Ry., 250 U.S. 473 (1919), in which the Court stated that
the purpose of Rule 41(a) (1), Fed. R. Civ. P., is to safeguard abuse of the right to
nonsuit by limiting its application to an early stage in the proceedings.
" Hartquist v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 139 Fla. 328, 190 So. 533 (1939); Lyon v.
Craig, 213 Iowa 36, 238 N.W. 452 (1931); Thomason v. Sherrill, 118 Tex. 44, 10 S.W.2d
687 (1928). If the defendant pleaded defensive matters upon which a cross action might
have been based, but neglected to pray for affirmative relief, then the answer was defensive
only. Hutchison v. Robert Hamilton & Son, 234 S.W. 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
" Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Dakota,
and Vermont have no statutory limits.
"E.g., California and Idaho provide that the nonsuit must be asked for, as a matter
of right, before trial. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. S 581(1); Jalof v. Robbins, 19 Cal. 2d 233,
120 P.2d 19 (1941); Idaho Code Ann. 5 10-705 (1948); Molen v. Denning & Clark
Livestock Co., 56 Idaho 57, 50 P.2d 9 (1935).
'
4 See Annot., 71 A.L.R. 1001 (1931). Texas follows the majority. Clevenger v. Cariker,
110 S.W. 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
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which permits nonsuit anytime before judgment, without the per-
mission of the court."
Rule 164 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides:"
At any time before the jury has retired the Plaintiff may take a non-
suit, but he shall not thereby prejudice the right of an adverse party
to be heard on his claim for affirmative relief. When such case is tried
by the judge, such non-suit may be taken at any time before the de-
cision is announced.
Texas cases generally hold that the plaintiff has an absolute right to
a nonsuit, even after the defendant has answered if the defendant
requests no affirmative relief.19 Rule 164 is unchanged from the
predecessor statute,"' and decisions construing that statute govern
the interpretation of the rule, which is construed liberally to effectu-
ate the right to nonsuit." The Supreme Court of Texas has held that
an absolute right exists any time before the jury has retired2 or if
there is no jury, before the judge announces his decision.2" Even
though the rule states that nonsuit may be taken before the jury
retires, the plaintiff may, as a matter of right, have his nonsuit if the
jury fails to agree.' Once nonsuit is granted, the judge has no right
to retain the case on the docket."
Some modification of Rule 164 has come about through case law
interpretation. Nonsuit must be made in good faith and cannot be
brought repeatedly for harrassment purposes." Also, once a defendant
files a claim for affirmative relief, the court will retain jurisdiction."
In State v. Stanolind," it was held that if the defendant asks for
17La. Code Prac. Ann. art. 491 (1942).
18 Tex. R. Civ. P. 164.
"Brooks v. O'Conner, 120 Tex. 121, 39 S.W.2d 22 (1931) (plaintiff's right to non-
suit at any time before the jury retires is absolute and cannot be denied).
"°Formerly art. 2182, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. (1925).
21 See Smith v. Columbian Carbon Co., 145 Tex. 478, 198 S.W.2d 727 (1947); Texas
Van Lines, Inc. v. Templeton, 305 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) error ref. n.r.e.;
Collins v. Waldo, 291 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); McClendon v. McClendon,
289 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
22 Smith v. Columbian Carbon Co., supra note 21.
23 Ibid.
2 Wiley v. Joinder, 223 S.W.2d 539 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
23 McMinn v. Department of Pub. Safety, 307 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (the
appropriate order to be entered on motion for nonsuit is "dismissal without prejudice").
"Walsh & Co. v. Butler, Inc., 260 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), aff'd, 152 Tex.
601, 262 S.W.2d 952 (1953); see University of Tex. v. Morris, 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.W.2d
426 (1961), in which the supreme court held that a trial court has the power to prevent
a plaintiff from prosecuting his cause of action in another court, if such is necessary to
prohibit the use of the judical process for the purpose of harrassment. Renfroe v. Johnson,
142 Tex. 251, 177 S.W.2d 600 (1944).
"Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 291 S.W.2d 677 (1956).
28 190 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. In Hoodless v. Winter, 80 Tex.
638, 16 S.W. 427 (1891), the defendant filed a counterclaim seeking affirmative relief,
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affirmative relief, the court has no right to prejudice the defendant's
claim by granting a nonsuit requested by plaintiff. The court reason-
ed that a party to a suit should not have the right to deny his ad-
versary an affirmative claim by the voluntary action of nonsuit. How-
ever, dilatory pleas, such as a plea of privilege," and pleas not asking
for affirmative relief do not prejudice the right to nonsuit." Also, the
plaintiff's motion for nonsuit is not affected by a later amendment
which seeks affirmative relief."
In the principal case, Defendant's contention was that the State
had no right to nonsuit because the first court still had jurisdiction
over Defendant's "counterclaim." The Texas Supreme Court held
that Defendant's answer did not seek affirmative relief; rather, it
was an assertion of an affirmative defense. The court said that it
knew of no instance in which an affirmative counterclaim had been
used in an ouster suit. Moreover, in order for a defendant's claim
to constitute one for affirmative relief, it must not depend upon the
plaintiff's continuing his suit. Since Defendant's counterclaim was
essentially dependent upon the state's action, the court reasoned that
it was not a claim for affirmative relief. One example of a valid claim
for affirmative relief is found in Graham v. Seale."' In Graham, the
plaintiff filed for divorce, and the defendant counterclaimed for
divorce. The court held that a subsequent motion for nonsuit by
the plaintiff would not defeat the court's jurisdiction over the
counterclaim. If a defendant, in his answer, moves that the court
enjoin the plaintiff from nonsuiting, this would be a valid claim
for affirmative relief. However, the only instances in which a de-
and the plaintiff was not permitted to nonsuit because it would prejudice the right of the
defendant to be heard on his counterclaim.
"
9 Rice v. Raleigh Co., 48 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). A plaintiff's right to
dismiss is not affected by the filing of a plea of privilege by a defendant, such being only
a dilatory plea presenting no defense to the merits of the plaintiff's cause of action and
asserting no cause of action, in any respect, against him. Ibid.
31 Ibid.
"l In Walker v. Hernandez, 92 S.W. 1067 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), the plaintiff moved
for nonsuit after the answer was filed, but before the defendant amended asking for
affirmative relief. In granting the nonsuit, the court held, "pleadings are considered
as consisting alone of the pleadings in existence at the time the plaintiff asks to take
nonsuit." Id. at 1068. In Kelly v. National Bank of Denison, 233 S.W. 782 (Tex. Civ. App.
1921), the defendant, after plaintiff requested nonsuit, asked the court to withhold its
order until the defendant could file a counterclaim. The court held that it had no power
to grant the defendant's request.
3221 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); see Standard Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
215 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e., in which a suit was brought
against several parties, including the Railroad Commission, to set aside proration orders of
the Commission. The Commission, in its answer, prayed that the orders be sustained; the
answers of the other parties prayed that the plaintiff take nothing or that judgment be
entered approving the proration rules in issue. The court said the defendants' pleadings,
taken together, were sufficient to support a prayer for affirmative relief and refused to
grant the plaintiff's nonsuit without prejudice.
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fendant would be successful in this respect are cases in which the
plaintiff seeks a nonsuit in bad faith or repeatedly sues and nonsuits
in a harrassing manner.33
A liberal nonsuit rule can create substantial injustice." It has
caused many defendants to spend both time and money in preparing
and possibly in presenting a case, only to have the plaintiff nonsuit.
A plaintiff can take advantage of this device when it appears the
case is going badly. Moreover, the rule has little to recommend it
but fourteenth-century English precedent and tradition which, in
England, has been considerably restricted.3 Realizing the inequities,
some jurisdictions in the United States have placed restrictions on the
common-law doctrine. The federal rule is an excellent example of
the modern trend. Although some of the injustices persist, the fed-
eral rule affords substantial protection to the defendant which would
not be available under a liberal nonsuit rule. With the modern
methods of discovery and the crowded court dockets, there is little
justification for a court to allow a plaintiff his nonsuit after his case
has been presented. Texas should amend its rule to conform with the
federal and state rules which limit nonsuit. However, should the
restrictive federal rule be thought too harsh in light of the liberal
Texas tradition, some compromise provision could be effected which
would relieve the defendant of the hazard of presenting his case only
to have a nonsuit entered. Denying the plaintiff the right to nonsuit
after he has rested his case would answer many of the arguments pro
and con raised by plaintiffs and defendants attorneys. A more restric-
tive rule, as to the time when and the conditions under which non-
suit is available, would eliminate much injustice.
Banker Phares
a University of Tex. v. Morris, 162 Tex. 60, 344 S.W.2d 426 (1961); see also Renfroe
v. Johnson, 142 Tex. 251, 177 S.W.2d 600 (1944), in which the plaintiff's attorney stated
in open court that suit would be filed against the defendant at every term of court in
the future. The court said the suit was brought maliciously without probable cause and
granted the defendant's injunction.
' McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 17.16 (Callaghan 1950).
35 See notes 6, 7 supra and accompanying text.
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